(for one thing this assumes great success and attainment of objectives in these older immigration countries). Giuseppe Sciortino (1999) is critical of the southern European exceptionalism school of thought which, he argues, runs as follows: weak border controls, leading to a tolerance of illegal immigration, creating havens for clandestine immigration. He argues that there has in fact been a remarkable turnaround in southern European immigration policies with the adoption of a 'stop and contain' approach centred on external frontier controls that is similar to other EU member states. That said, the perception that southern Europe remains Europe's 'soft underbelly' will not have been helped by events such as those in Sicily in March 2002 when -accompanied by a Europe-wide media frenzy -more than 900 Kurds arrived in the port of Catania.
That said, there are measures that aim to secure the external frontiers of southern European countries, which in an integrated Europe will become the EU's external frontiers. The Spanish police, for instance, are developing with EU financial support a $150 million 'electronic wall' that will cover 350 miles of Spanish coastline from Huelva in south west Spain to Almeria in the south east that will be able to detect boats (particularly from North Africa) containing would-be migrants that are 7 miles out to sea and then dispatch police to intercept them (Migration News, September 2000) . This arises from concern about the small boats packed with clandestine immigrants who make the perilous journey from North Africa to Spain. Concerns about porous borders have been evident in Italy where substantial efforts have been made -more money and a reorganisation of the frontier police-to increase the capacity to control the country's external frontiers at vulnerable points such as the land border with Slovenia and the coastline of the southern region of Puglia (Pastore, 2001b) .
The external control dimension is only part of the story. What happens within these states is equally as important. The underlyll::lg issues in southern Europe have been the persistence of relatively high levels of economic informality and irregular migration. Maria Baganha (2000: 170) has written that economic informality is 'a distinctive feature of Southern European migratory processes' and creates spaces for irregular migrants. This is not to say that informality and irregularity are unique to southern Europe. There is informality and irregular immigration in older immigration countries too, but not on the same scale. Tackling informality through tough labour market regulation raises issues that go wider than immigration and touch upon state-society relations and social control more generally. Put bluntly, external controls impact on foreigners who can't vote; internal controls affect citizens who can.
A key aspect of the internal response to immigration in southern Europe has been the regularisation of the status of irregular migrants. These regularisations have more to do with prevailing informality than with EU policy. Indeed, if regularisations encourage further immigration, as some argue they do, then a principal policy instrument employed in southern Europe runs counter to the EU policy frame and is determined largely by domestic factors.
• The rapid economic development of southern European countries has created labour market shortages. Moreover, the relatively large informal sector has created spaces for irregular migration.
• Domestic labour market changes have meant that immigrants (employed either formally or informally) are needed to do the jobs that native workers seem no longer willing to do. In Italy there are high levels of unemployment in the south, but southern Italians are less willing either to move north or outside Italy in search of work. High unemployment can co-exist with immigration, which suggests dual labour markets with migrants inserted into those economic activities that native workers are less willing to do.
• A sharp demographic frontier has low-birth rate southern European countries on one side and high-birth rate North African countries on the other.
Economic informality is a key aspect of King's model. Economic informality can be defined as income earning activities that are not regulated by the state in situations where similar activities are regulated (Castells and Portes, 1989) . A person can be employed on a building site or as a domestic worker either formally (taxes and social contributions paid) or informally (taxes and social contributions unpaid). Immigration did not cause informality. In the case of Italy, Reyneri (1998) argues that a heritage of informality has been linked to labour market rigidities, high labour costs, strict working regulations, low productivity growth, lax enforcement by public bodies, and low levels of social control, all of which lead to a tolerance of free riders. Mingione and Quassoli (2000: 32) argue that informality is 'an element of continuity in the mode of [Italian] national economic organisation '. Martiniez Viega (1999: 105) makes a similar point in relation to Spain when arguing that 'informal employment' has 'revitalised old traditions'. The irony is that this occurs when immigration could be seen as indicative of Spain's entry into a more advanced stage of capitalist development. Figure 7 .1 illustrates the links between the constitutive markets of the economy.
Levels of informality are, of course, difficult to judge although some estimates-or to be more precise, ranges of estimates-can be provided that give an idea of the prevalence of informality as an economic form in southern Europe (see Table 7 .1).
The advantages of informality and irregular migration arise from the trade-off between the lower costs for employers who avoid tax and social costs and for the migrants the opportunity to obtain employment and earn more than they would in their country of origin. For states the tolerance of some illegality can be less costly than strict controls and tight social regulation. Moreover, small and medium sized enterprises can have a more precarious cost base, depend on hiring and firing flexibility and thus benefit from the hiring of irregular workers. These can thrive if the The disadvantages of informality and irregularity can be listed under five headings (Jahn and Straubhaar, 1999):
• Informal workers are outside of the tax system, but use welfare state services.
• Informality can bring the state's regulatory capacity into disrepute.
• Irregular migrants jump the queue ahead of those who go through the proper channels. The fact that the regular channels can be a bureaucratic nightmare while there is a demand for migrant workers may also help explain irregular migration.
• Irregular migrants are pushed into areas of the economy where they are more open to abuse in terms of pay and work conditions.
• Irregular migrants can fall into the hands of traffickers who exploit the demand for admission by offering control-busting and risky entry into southern European countries.
The most commonly used mechanism to address irregularity has been regularisations. Table 7 .2 provides data on regularisations in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Regularisations seek to manage the flow from the informal to the formal sector. The persistence of a pool of irregular migrants could encourage employers to switch activities to the informal sector. At the same time, frequent regularisations can encourage more irregular migration. To be effective regularisations need to at least have the impression of being one-off events. If regularisations are like buses-there'll Italian immigration policy concentrated on legalising and regularising migrant flows rather than reducing them (Pugliese, 1998: 5-28) . This laissez faire approach was called into question with the murder in 1989 of an immigrant in the southern region of Calabria, which led to a public outcry and calls that 'something must be done'. The Martelli law of 1990 extended the right to asylum to include people from non-Soviet bloc countries and initiated a new regularisation. Other provisions were more repressive, such as the use of visas to limit migration flows from sending countries, increased emphasis on external frontier controls and provisions for increased deportations. The basic failing of the Martelli Law as identified by Reyneri (1998: 314) was that it failed to tackle irregular immigration-because Zincone (1999: 53) argues, trade unions and pro-migrant NGOs helped shape the law. The result was that the law sent out the message that Italy was relatively open to illegal immigration.
Attempts to manage policy were undermined by the arrival of large numbers of Albanians after 1990 with renewed flows after 1997. It was, however, difficult to legislate between 1992 and 1996 because of the political transition from the first to the second republic following the mani pulite (clean hands) corruption scandals of the early 1990s. A 1995 Decree introduced by the technocratic government of Lamberto Dini mainly dealt with expulsions and frontier controls. The Dini decree was renewed either in part or in full five times during 1995 and 1996 but never acquired the parliamentary approval necessary to become law.
The Turco-Napolitano law of 1998 introduced by the centre-left government maintained the repressive elements linked to Italy's EU obligations through reinforced measures dealing with entry, residence and expulsions. Reception centres were introduced for irregular immigrants. The rightwing parties had wanted illegal entry to be classed as a crime. The left resisted this. Reception centres were a compromise and were open to significant regional variation in implementation. The more liberal elements of the Turco-Napolitano Law included provisions for the 'sponsorship' of new immigrants by Italian citizens, legally resident foreigners, regions, local administrations, unions and voluntary organisations. Sponsored migrants would be issued with a temporary permit. Provisions on family reunification were also broadened to include relatives of the 'third degree' such as uncles, aunts and great grandchildren. The law also established provisions for residence permits to be granted to prostitutes prepared to denounce pimps and people traffickers. Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands offer permits to women who denounce their pimps. The Italian authorities issued around 2000 permits on these grounds in 2000 and around 1500 pimps were identified (Migration News, September 2001).
The Berlusconi government introduced a new immigration law (Law 795) in 2001. The new law links work and residence permits in the form of a contratto di soggiorno. These permits will last only as long as the contract of employment. The new legislation also proposed that sponsorship be abolished. The length of time during which suspected illegal entrants This gives us a slightly different take on Hollifield's (2000b) argument that domestic ideas and institutions will constrain the control capacity of states and lead them to prefer external measures such as EU co-operation where these constraints are less pronounced. Hollifield's reference point is France where state penetration of society is far deeper than in Italy. Yet, in Italy too ideas and institutions can inhibit control capacity, albeit as a result of a lower level of state penetration of society creating more space for informality and irregular migration. Sciortino (1999: 256) also injects a note of healthy caution when considering the 'crisis' of control, which he links to unrealistic expectations and vicarious fears (of immigrant criminality and ensuing moral panic, for instance) rather than a structural feature of the real processes. At the same time, he acknowledges that the problem in Italy (and in other southern European countries too) remains the relatively weak internal controls, which point to the 'special, well-entrenched mode of relationship between the Italian state and Italian society'. This is a theme that recurs when we explore responses in Greece, Portugal and Spain.
Economic informality, irregular migration and strict controls in Greece
Greece combines high levels of economic informality and irregular migration with stringent control legislation. For geographical reasons it is central to many of the people smuggling networks within the EU and on its borders. This is compounded by the sheer scale of Greece's external frontiers that make control in the strict sense of the term well-nigh impossible. These high levels of informality and irregular migration are also coupled with public hostility towards migrants. The survey of attitudes towards minorities by the EU Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia suggested that Greek respondents had negative attitudes towards minorities that were above the EU average, were less willing to accept refugees, and linked migrants with economic competition and crime (EUMC, 2001: 12) . Greek laws have been draconian. The 1991 Immigration Law made illegal immigration an offence punishable by between ten days and five years in jail. Yet, high levels of irregular migration persist. The numbers of irregular migrants were estimated at between 400,000 and 500,000 in the late-1990s, or around 10 per cent of the Greek labour force (Fakiolas, 2000) . The large-scale presence of irregular migrants is coupled with a public intolerance of their presence in Greece.
There was some post Cold War 'return migration' by Pontian Greeks from the former USSR. A key issue has been migration from Albania. The militarisation of the Greek-Albanian border is redolent of the 'border games' played on the US-Mexican border -another border of poverty separating relative prosperity from high levels of deprivation (Andreas, 2000; King, Iosifides and Myrivili, 1998) . Albanian migrants have been linked to crime and the stereotype of the criminal Albanian immigrant has and social attitudes hostile (Lazaridis, 1996; Triandafyllidou, 2000) . The result has been an inability and/ or unwillingness to deal with the major administrative and political issues that concerted attempts at the regulation of economic informality would have for migrants and Greek citizens.
Informality and irregularity in Portugal
Portugal became an immigration country in the 1980s. It has attracted migrants from former colonies, as well as growing numbers from countries with which Portugal does not have strong ties, such as eastern European countries. In some respects, Portugal is an unlikely immigration country: it's relatively poor, has a low qualified work force, and low social security benefits. At the same time, the Portuguese economy is generating labour demands for both skilled and unskilled workers that immigrants meet. What is more, their economic insertion is taking place in both the formal and informal sectors (Baganha, 1998 (Baganha, , 2000 .
The centre-right coalition elected in March 2002 pledged a tougher line on immigration, but in doing so highlighted implementation issues that are central to southern European migration policy. Portugal is a Schengen state and was quick to put immigration legislation in place in the early 1980s. This was linked to the transition from authoritarian government, administrative modernisation and EU membership rather than to largescale immigration at that time. Two new laws in 1993 brought Portuguese law into line with Schengen obligations and illustrate the ways in which formal policy developments have been influenced by EU obligations.
Why does Portugal have relatively high levels of informality? Research suggests that it is relatively easy to live and work in Portugal without the necessary permits and that this will continue so long as 'existing government agencies maintain their traditional inefficiency in controlling labour' (Baganha, 1998: 276) . There is little stigma attached to informal work and sometimes even the state can be an informal employer. The result is that the informal economy is an integral part of the Portuguese national economy. The economic insertion of migrant workers is also gendered with men tending to work in sectors such as construction and building while the economic participation of female migrants is directed towards sectors of the household economy. Around 65 per cent of the immigrant population live in the metropolitan area of Lisbon.
The formal adherence to EU requirements has also been accompanied by regularisations, which are driven by domestic priorities. In 2001, Portugal launched a new regularisation programme, which by August 2001 had seen 90,700 work permits issued. Around 30 per cent of those regularised were Ukrainians. The numbers of people regularised could cause us to reflect on the idea of 'fortress Europe'. There has been continued large-scale migration into southern Europe despite the introduction of restrictive immigration legislation. But these issues of enforcement and Spanish Foreign Ministry. The Foreign Ministry would then forward the application to the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, which would request a report from its office in the province where the migrant proposed to work. For the permit to be issued the investigating authorities would have to be satisfied that there were no Spaniards or EU nationals capable of doing the job. Second, Spain has employed a quota system for new migrants. Third, regularisations ushered irregular migrants from the informal to the formal economy.
Spain has also experienced political mobilisation around the immigration issue both on the pro-and anti-side of the debate. There was, for instance, a strong element of anti-immigration sentiment in the response to the murder of a 26 year old woman in the town of El Ejido by a young man identified by witnesses as being of Maghrebi origin. The monitor of Spanish public opinion provided by the Centre for Sociological Research shows that the immigration issue had acquired increased salience. The number of respondents that included immigration as one of the two or three most important issues in Spain rose from 6. Legislation promulgated in early 2000 had been criticised for encouraging illegal immigration because it gave undocumented migrants access to health and education and also to political rights such as union membership. This legislation was approved· at the time when the centre-right Partido Popular (PP) lacked an absolute majority in Parliament. The result was that the PP relied on the support of other parties such as the Catalan nationalists who heavily influenced the shape of the legislation with the result that the PP ended up with more liberal legislation than it had wanted.
The legislation was then changed in a more restrictive direction when the PP won an absolute majority in the 2000 general election. The subsequent immigration law of August 2000 removed the rights of irregular migrants to union membership, the right to association, to demonstrate and to go on strike. The new law also sought to increase the numbers of expulsions, which directly threatened the 30,000 or so people that had been denied regularisation in 2000. The prospect of deportation led 700 irregular immigrants to go on hunger strike. The left, trade unions and pro-migrants NGOs mobilised in support of the hunger strikers in ways that were redolent of support for the sans papiers in France. In August 2001, the Spanish government announced that irregular immigrants who can prove that they have been working in Spain since January 2000 can obtain legal residency. In future it is planned that a quota system based on labour market needs will regulate flows.
Migration and foreign policy
Spain is also interesting because policy developments indicate links between migration and foreign policy. Movement by people from one state to another does, of course, affect politics within and between states. What is new is the changed geo-political configuration, the altered perceptions of security, migration's entry into the realm of 'high politics', and the impact of European integration. Spain has seen its relations with Mediterranean states as a foreign policy opportunity which could allow Spain to 'co-operate as a first division European country, and by doing so, facilitate its eventual ascent into the lead group of EU countries' (Gillespie, 1996: 195) . Spain has been a leading player in co-operation organised within the Barcelona Process that involves the 15 EU member states and 12 Mediterranean states. Since 2000 the Barcelona Process has evolved to include Justice and Home Affairs issues. Spain has also negotiated bilateral agreements with north African countries that provide for the return of irregular migrants. The agreement signed with Morocco on July 25 2001 sets an annual quota of between 10,000 and 20,000 immigrants and provides that irregular migrants can be returned within 72 hours. The Spanish government was dissatisfied with the agreement because it applied mainly to labour issues and they had wanted to include policing. Spain has not been alone in seeking agreements with sending countries. Italy has negotiated an agreement with Albania (as well as north African and Baltic states). In 1997 the Italian government was even able to send Italian naval vessels into Albanian territorial waters in an effort to prevent boats full of would-be migrants departing for Italy. Italy has also participated in the Central European Initiative through which it co-operates with Austria and 14 central and east European countries on illegal immigration, terrorism and cross-border crime.
Greece too has particular concerns because it is at the hub of people smuggling and trafficking networks. In November 2001, Greece and Turkey signed an agreement that will allow Greece to send back illegal immigrants that entered the country through Turkey within 14 days of their arrival. International migration relations between the two countries had become tense. In September 2000, the Greek authorities arrested 1200 Turks accused of being involved in people smuggling and of charging up to $1000 per person for illegal entry to Greece. On December 3 2001 the Greek authorities forcibly returned 34 of a group of 89 Afghans and Iraqi Kurds to Turkey without allowing them to apply for asylum. Amnesty International expressed the concern that these people could then be forcibly returned to their countries of origin where they might face serious violations of their human rights.
To sum up, southern European countries have all adopted their national legislation to account for EU requirements. This has led to increased emphasis on external frontier control and an increased capacity to control these external frontiers, as well as an increased willingness to expel illegal immigrants (and establish agreements with third countries to facilitate these expulsions). The EU has provided a policy frame that heavily influenced the repressive elements of southern European policy with the accompanying normative disposition to restrict. There is, of course, the lingering counterfactual: would these countries have done these things anyway if it had not been for the EU? The development of immigration and asylum policy could be explained as part of more general administra-· tive modernisation (although here too the impact of EU membership plays a part) or as a response to immigration that would have occurred with or without EU membership (although the EU has provided the frame for adaptation). In formal terms, there is a reasonable 'goodness of fit' between EU objectives and domestic policies and institutions centred on control of external frontiers. If we tum our attention to the issues of economic informality and irregular migration then we see more divergence. A key feature of migration into southern Europe has been the economic insertion of migrant workers in the informal sector. The response to this -regularisations -runs counter to the restrictive objectives of EU policy if they lead to further irregular migration in expectation of the next regularisation. Yet, to tackle informality and irregularity has implications for state-society relations that go far beyond the immigration issue. Indeed, as is shown in the next section, informality and irregularity also have implications for immigrant policies in southern European countries.
Immigrant policies
The typical reference points for debates about immigrant integration tend to be the nation state and national society (Favell, 2001) . European countries Another key variable that relates closely to the integration of immigrants is the organisation of the welfare state. It has been argued that there is a southern European welfare state model derived from a combination of occuptionalism (a maintenance system) with universalism (health care system) that is not found in other parts of Europe (Ferrera, 1996) . Because of relatively low levels of coverage there can be a reliance on non-state institutions such as voluntary organisations, as well as moral obligations within the family that particularly fall on women. For instance, Saraceno (1994) argues that the Italian 'familialist' welfare system is based on the perception of the family as unit of income and resources with women having a primary responsibility in the provision of care. In addition to this, informality leads to high levels of tax evasion and also to state avoidance strategies. This can lead us to think about the relationship between state and society and the implications for migrants that these types of welfare system and the levels of informality that co-exist alongside them can have.
In her analysis of the social rights of migrants in Portugal Maria Baganha (2000) argues that the problems for migrants are the immediate questions of poor housing, low welfare state protection, high levels of informality, the role played by the Catholic church and voluntary organisations, as well as significant regional variations. But these are not issues that are confined to migrants. They also affect Portuguese citizens and have implications for state-society relations and the perception of citizenship as a process and thus as more than just a formal status. Baganha argues that part of the problem in Portugal is that Portuguese citizens have not 'internalised' their own social rights in the sense that they tend to view the state as unreliable and to take their own social protection measures and engage in state avoidance strategies. Baganha then argues that if Portuguese citizens have not internalised their own social citizenship then there may not be an expectation that similar rights be extended to migrants. Informality thus has implications both for state-society relations and for citizenship as a process of inclusion. It demonstrates that we need to consider the characteristics of the local, regional and national units that mediate inclusion and exclusion and their relationship in southern Europe to irregularity and informality.
In Italy as in other southern European countries there has been a remarkable local divergence because much of the responsibility for dealing with migrants falls on towns and cities that can be more or less well equipped to deal with these issues. In Italy, Zincone (1999) argues that the diversity of the response had the beneficial effect of allowing a thousand flowers to bloom and for some of the better ideas from the periphery to inform practices at the centre. Yet there was little funding to support these plans. The brightest of bright ideas are likely to lose some of their brilliance if there is no money to actually implement them.
The Spanish government published a 'Plan for the social integration of foreigners' in 1994, but this was a statement of good intentions rather than a practical plan of action. There was little political mobilisation around
Conclusion
This chapter's analysis of southern Europe has demonstrated the importance of examining the categorisation of migrants and the ability of institutions and organisations to shape understandings of migration and migrants. Migration policy issues have centred on both external and internal policy dimensions, but with a particular focus on irregular migrants and economic informality. Informality and irregularity have important implications for immigration and immigrant policies, but these categories are not just synonyms for 'backwardness' in the sense that southern European countries are more open to migration than northern European countries. Southern Europe is proximate to areas from which there are migration pressures, there is demand for migrant workers, while the area is closer to some of the world's trouble spots. The point is that migrants can be viewed differently in southern Europe-as illegals, rather than say as asylum seekers in older immigration countries -and processed in different social and political contexts.
The persistence of irregular migration could be attributed to the absence of effective external controls and a lack of fit with EU policy. In these terms, we could suppose that the EU's impact on law and policy in southern European countries has been limited. This perception would be mistaken. Southern European countries have adapted to the restrictive elements of EU policy, which have focused on external controls, with the result that legislation in southern European countries accords with that in other member states. There is, of course, the point that perhaps southern European countries would have developed such policies anyway irrespective of the ED's influence because of increased immigration since the 1980s, but this is not a particularly convincing argument. The policy frame provided by the EU has had a decisive influence on the 'repressive' elements of policy in these countries. The EU was also a more general pressure for administrative modernisation in Greece, Portugal and Spain. In addition to this, we can also see attempts to externalise these controls and forge closer links between migration and security that are also prevailing features of the EU response.
The adherence to EU policy is, though, only part of the story. These external controls also need to be considered alongside internal controls. It is here that informality and irregularity suggest some divergence with an EU model predicated on external and internal control and in turn, it could be argued, that makes assumptions about the organisation of society and the regulatory capacity of member states. Southern European countries are not as highly organised, the penetration of society by state institutions is at a lower level, while expectations about the state's role differ. Moreover, a key feature of the policy response in southern Europe -the frequent use of regularisations -has been largely governed by domestic responses to economic informality and irregularity than by EU policy.
Irregularity and informality also impinge on the issue of immigrant integration. If we take older immigration countries as a reference when discussing immigrant integration, then we tend to bring with us other elements of the conceptual baggage derived from highly organised societies, coupled with citizens' expectations about state capacity. This implicit reference to older immigration countries doesn't work quite so well in southern European countries where state-society relations are configured differently and where state capacity and, equally importantly, expectations about state capacity can differ. These points are developed more fully in the following chapter which explores responses in central and eastern European countries that are not yet EU members, but whose migration policy development have been largely driven by the obligations of future EU membership.
